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MEANS/ENDS ANALYSIS IN COPYRIGHT
LAW: ELDRED V. ASHCROFT IN ONE ACT
Dan T. Coenen* and Paul . Heald**
Scene: The quiet hallway of a law school. A troubled young
professor of Intellectual Property law stands in front of a senior colleague's office and studies a pencil sketch of Bushrod Washington
taped to the door. After a brief hesitation, he knocks and enters.
Have you got a minute? I've got an Intellectual Property
IP:
Clause question, and I really need the opinion of an expert in Constitutional Law.
CL: Sit down! It wouldn't be about Eldred v. Ashcroft,'
would it? I noticed that the Supreme Court had granted cert the other
day on the issue of retroactive extension of the copyright term.
IP:
That's right. The Court is going to decide whether Congress can prevent old works from falling into the public domain by
extending the monopoly previously given to copyright holders. It's
ridiculous! When Gershwin wrote his Concerto in F in 1925, he
knew that the law would grant him rights until 1983 at the most.
Now, under the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
(CTEA), the concerto won't enter the public domain until 2025-that
is, if Congress doesn't extend the publisher's copyright even further.
CL: I don't see anything in the Constitution that says Congress can't pass ridiculous laws.
IP:
No, but you will find the Intellectual Property Clause in
Article I, Section 8. If you recall, the Court has held that a specialized grant of power-like the bankruptcy power-may restrain Congress from regulating the subject2 matter of that power under other
grants like the Commerce Clause.
CL:

So?
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IP:
So, I think Congress either can grant these retroactive
extensions under the Intellectual Property Clause, or it can't grant
them at all.
CL: Well, let's take a look at this Intellectual Property Clause
of yours. Here in Article I it says: "Congress shall have Power...
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." 3 So, why can't Congress extend copyright protection in existing works? One hundred years of
protection for Gershwin's concerto is a long while, but it's still a
"limited" time, isn't it?
IP:
That's actually not so clear, in part because any actuary
will tell you that the present value of a hundred-year income stream
is about the same as an infinite one. 4 But, for now at least, I want to
put to one side the "limited Times" language. 5 The language I find
most important is in the opening clause. How on earth can it possibly "promote Science and useful Arts" to grant an author's heirs a
bonus term of protection decades after a work has already been created? The Court has always talked about the Intellectual Property
Clause in terms of the economic incentives it authorizes Congress to
create. 6 How can Congress incentivize a work that already exists?
CL:

Incentivize? What kind of IP jargon is that?

IP:
Give me a break! Just yesterday I heard you carrying on
about the dormant Commerce Clause, whatever that is. Anyway,
how can Congress incentivize works that already exist?
CL: Maybe Congress figures that some authors are more
likely to produce works if they know their heirs might get more
rights down the road.
IP:
So you think Congress envisioned potential authorsalready promised a term that lasts for life plus fifty years beyondwould choose to create more works because of the possibility that
some future Congress will extend the rights of their great-greatgrandchildren? Let's give Congress more credit than that!
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CL: Well it sounds to me like you've got this incentivizing
business all figured out. Why do you need help from me?
IP:
Here's my problem. I've been following this case very
closely, and I'm confused by some of the arguments that I've been
hearing. Both sides seem obsessed with legislative history and Congress's motives for passing the legislation. It seems to me that the
Constitution either forbids a certain type of statute or it doesn't.
Congress's intent, as opposed to the Framers' intent, seems irrelevant
as to whether a law is unconstitutional. Can a good motive save a
bad law? Or vice-versa?
CL: In fact, the Supreme Court has said that a bad motive can
invalidate an otherwise good law under many constitutional provisions, including the Establishment Clause,7 the Free Exercise
Clause, 8 the Equal Protection Clause, 9 and-yes-even the dormant
Commerce Clause.' 0 Of course those cases don't so much involve
limitations on Congress's Article I lawmaking powers as they involve the protection of individual rights. Additionally, despite tons
of cases that say motive matters, there is plenty of rhetoric in Supreme Court opinions suggesting that legislative motive should notor at least normally should not-count in constitutional decisionmaking." In a nutshell, the Court's treatment of motive in constitutional cases is pretty messy.12 What does the legislative history show
about Congress's motives in passing this CTEA?
IP:
Well, you won't be surprised to learn that copyright term
extension was pushed by Disney, the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP), the American Motion Picture
Association and other owners of income streams on the verge of drying up. But Congress was wise enough not to let on that the extension was just a giveaway to wealthy campaign contributors. The official committee reports say that the retroactive extension will
harmonize U.S. law with the E.U. copyright term and help preserve
3
old films.'
CL:

Does it?

IP:

Does it what?

102
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CL: Harmonize U.S. law with European law and help preserve old films?
IP:
What does it matter? Harmony is great, but Congress
can't pass unconstitutional laws to make the Europeans happy! Do
you teach Reid v. Covert?14 After WWII, Congress honored a treaty
obligation with England by passing a law that took away the right to
a jury trial from some of our overseas citizens. The Court held that
Congress can't throw out the Constitution just to make foreign governments happy.
CL: We'll talk about Reid in a minute. What about preserving old films?
IP:
Let me start with a hypothetical. Imagine a law that rewarded the first person to restore an old silent film that was deteriorating. Let's say you could earn a ten-year exclusive right to show a
film if you really saved it from the dustbin. That statute would be
constitutional because a law that provides genuine incentives to preserve fading art should not be a problem under the Intellectual Property Clause.
CL:

I assume the CTEA doesn't do that?

IP:
Of course not. There's no requirement that anyone restore anything. The effect of the law is to make consumers pay billions to all sorts of copyright owners-not just owners of films. Also
there's no requirement that the money be spent on anything, far less
preserving old films.
CL:

How do you really feel about the law?

IP:
The same way the Framers of the Constitution would
have felt--completely outraged! Don't you constitutional law people care about original intent anymore?
CL: Sure we do, but there is nothing wrong with framing an
original-intent argument in the sort of rhetoric the Court often uses
nowadays when it talks about constitutional restraints.
IP:

What do you mean?
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CL: The important thing to see is that the Court frequently
discusses constitutional restrictions on government power in terms of
a means-ends analysis.15
Well, what would a means-ends analysis say about the
IP:
CTEA and preserving old movies?
CL: First, it suggests that you're missing something important by just asking about wrongful motives. After all, even you concede that helping to preserve old films is a purpose that Congress can
rightfully pursue; the problem is the way in which Congress is pursuing this goal. Who knows? Maybe granting retroactive extensions
will encourage preservation of a few old films, though it's hard for
me to see how. Even if it does, giving lengthy copyright extensions
to Gershwin's grandchildren, book publishers, and long-dead painters won't preserve old films at all. In other words, there is a big-time
problem with the means Congress has chosen to pursue its filmpreservation purpose. To use modem constitutional lingo, the law is
massively overinclusive. And even Chief Justice John Marshall said
that in order to pass constitutional muster, the law must be "really
calculated" to achieve the goal Congress has identified.' 6 Anyway,
as someone who has read a lot of constitutional law opinions, that's
how I see it.
Don't all those means-ends opinions have to do with
IP:
constitutional protections of individual rights, like the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment?
CL: Not really. My quote from Chief Justice Marshall concemed the grant of power to Congress under the Necessary and
Proper Clause of Article I, Section 8. The Rehnquist Court has
said-and genuinely meant-that congressional means for pursuing
a permissible goal must have a "proportionality" to that goal when
Congress invokes its powers under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments.' 7 Besides, even assuming a means-ends analysis is
especially well-suited for rights cases, I'll be surprised if you don't
tell me in a little while that the Constitution's treatment of copyrights
is closely tied to the First Amendment. 18 Beyond that, at least with
regard to the goal of preserving old films, perceiving a means-end
connection in this case may require such an "exercise of strained
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the basic due process proimagination"' 9 that the law violates ' even
20
"
"arbitrariness.
hibition on legislative
IP:
Hmmm. What about the congressional goal of harmonizing U.S. and E.U. copyright laws?
CL: What about that goal? Does the retroactive grant of
copyright extensions actually produce uniformity?
IP:
No way. International IP experts agree that the CTEA
doesn't harmonize U.S. and E.U. law. In fact,21they think that it may
exacerbate conflicts between the two systems.
CL: Those facts are very helpful to you because the Court
sometimes finds legislative means improper as a result of problems
other than over- and under-inclusiveness. In particular, the Court
sometimes finds "fit" problems because the means are too tenuously
connected to the declared legislative objective or because those
means have counterproductive effects. 22 On the other hand, I have to
warn you that the Court is normally hesitant to second-guess a legislature's choice of means for pursuing a permissible end, at least absent a smash-in-the-face means problem like we just talked about
with regard to old-movie preservation. This hesitance may be
heightened when we are talking about laws enacted by Congress, as
opposed to, for example, a local city council.23 And this hesitance is
heightened even more when we are talking about judicial review of
congressional judgments about foreign relations. 24 As I'm sure even
you can understand, the courts don't want to get into that business at
all.
IP:
But I still don't see why Congress can grant gratuitous
copyright extensions to improve our foreign relations.
CL: Excellent! Now you've brought us back to where we
began-by raising the issue of permissible legislative purposes.
IP:

What do you mean?

CL: Remember, you suggested that the preservation of old
movies was a purpose Congress could pursue consistent with the Intellectual Property Clause. But now you're questioning whether
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Congress can-regardless of how well its means and ends fit together-extend copyright protections to advance the goals of creating international uniformity of laws, improving relations with foreign
nations, achieving international equity, cutting down on administrative costs and the like.
IP:
Exactly. I repeat: How can Congress grant freebie
copyright extensions to improve our foreign relations or promote
"equity" when the Intellectual Property Clause permits the granting
of exclusive 2rights
only "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
5
useful Arts"?
CL: Hold on just a minute! The Constitution, after all,
doesn't contain only the Intellectual Property Clause. Article I, Section 8, for example, gives Congress authority to regulate foreign
commerce. 26 The cases say that Congress can pass laws to implement treaties under the Necessary and Proper Clause, even if its other
powers would not independently authorize those enactments. 27 The
Supreme Court even seems to believe that Congress has a nontextual "foreign affairs" power, at least if it acts in concert with the
28
President.
IP:
Well, maybe Congress can invoke its foreign-commerce,
treaty, and foreign-affairs powers in lots of ways. However, the
Constitution says Congress can grant exclusive rights to authors and
inventors only "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
29

Arts."

CL: Hold on another minute, and let me look at the Constitution again. Well, I do see the "To promote" language, but I don't see
the word "only" in front of it or anywhere else in the Intellectual
Property Clause.
IP:
Isn't the notion of "onlyness" implied? Why else would
the Framers put the introductory "To promote" clause in there?
CL: Maybe if I had a little more time, I could come up with
some explanation. For now, however, I have to admit that the introductory language of the Intellectual Property Clause is striking.
IP:

Why is that?
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CL: Because I can't think of any other clause in the Constitu30
tion that is structured in this sort of way.
IP:

What do you mean?

CL: Well, the Clause begins by saying that Congress has the
power to do something-namely, "[t]o promote"; then it goes on to
say that Congress can exercise that power in a particular waynamely, "by securing [exclusive rights] for limited Times to Authors." 31 Maybe the Framers--contrary to all your protests about
whether congressional purposes should matter in constitutional decision-making-wanted to place a special focus on congressional motivation in copyright-power cases. Maybe the Framers foresaw that
judicial examinations of purpose would prove controversial as a general matter and wanted to clarify that a careful focus on purpose was
appropriate in this context, even if it might not be in other areas of
constitutional law.
IP:
So, it's possible that the Court will brush off as beside
the point all this talk about harmonizing U.S. and E.U. law because
such a purpose doesn't concern promoting science and the useful
arts.
CL: It looks to me like the Court could take that approach if
it wanted to.
IP:

Cool.

CL: In effect you're making two separate points. First, when
Congress grants copyright protection it can't rely on any source of
authority other than the Intellectual Property Clause. Usually Article
I grants of power are not deemed exclusive in this way. For example, if Congress passes a tax that is not permissible under the taxing
power because the Court views it as a regulation,32 the Court will
still uphold the law under the commerce power so long as it deals
with a commercial activity that significantly affects commerce
among the states. 33 But in the copyright context your notion of exclusivity may well make good sense. For example, it may help promote commerce among the states to grant authors unlimited copyright terms. But it would make mincemeat of the "limited Times"
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language of the Intellectual Property Clause to let Congress grant
unlimited copyright terms under the Commerce Clause.
IP:
I totally agree. If Congress is going to grant exclusive
rights to authors and inventors, it has to act under the Intellectual
Property Clause. That's the whole point of the bankruptcy clause
case I mentioned right at the start.34 What else am I saying?
CL: The second thing I hear you saying is that the text of the
Intellectual Property Clause authorizes the grant of copyrights only
"[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts"-and that
harmonizing international copyright law doesn't do that.35 By the
way, why doesn't it? I would think that having international copyright law in disarray would tend to discourage creative activity.
IP:
Even assuming that's true for prospective works (which I
would question), it surely isn't true for works that already exist. It's
simply not possible to promote or discourage the creation of works
that are already created-as I'm sure even someone who doesn't like
the word "incentivize" can appreciate.
CL: Good point. And precisely because it's a good point, it
opens the door for the Court to use means-ends analysis to bonk the
CTEA. That's true even if the Court somehow says that international
relations concerns might justify non-incentivizing copyright laws in
rare emergency-type circumstances. After all, there's surely no
"compelling" foreign-relations reason to hand out these sweeping
retroactive term extensions
to Disney, the Gershwin estate, and every
36
other copyright holder.
IP:
All this talk about ends and means is interesting, but I
worry that it vastly over-complicates things and directs attention
away from what should be the point of focus in Intellectual Property
Clause cases.
CL:

What do you mean?

IP:

I prefer a simple, straightforward, objective test.

CL:

And what test is that?

LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:99

IP:
The quid pro quo test: Congress can only give someone
copyright or patent protection in exchange for a new creation. If
Congress doesn't grant the exclusive right as part of such an exchange, it has acted unconstitutionally-period.37
CL:

Perhaps your test is not as simple as you think.

IP:

What do you mean?

CL: You said earlier, for example, that Congress could give
copyright protection to someone who preserved an old film. But an
"old film" is not a "new creation." So I have trouble seeing how
your supposedly simple test gets you where you want to go.
IP:
History indicates that "new" means "previously unavailable to the public," not "absolutely novel. 38 Patents for new inventions in seventeenth-century England, for example, included any innovation "new to the realm," 39 like a glass-blowing process used in
Italy but unknown in England. Until 1976, copyright law measured
the duration of rights from the moment of publication rather than
creation.4 0 A new creation is one the public gets access to for the
41
first time.
CL: If someone preserves an old film, that act doesn't give
public access to that film "for the first time." So I'm still not sure
your "simple" test quite works.
IP:
Alright, I suppose I will have to argue more broadly that
in certain circumstances "maintaining access" could constructively
satisfy the requirement of providing "new access" to a work. Under
the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), for example, the destruction
of some public artworks without the author's permission is prohib42
ited by way of a legal protection written into the copyright statutes.
Assuming the Intellectual Property Clause provides the source of
power to enact this law, I don't see any constitutional problem because creation of a new work of art is a pre-requisite to receiving
augmented protection.
I might add that Congress did not apply
43
VARA retroactively.
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CL:
Here's another question about your simple quid pro quo
test. What if Congress gave all copyright holders a monetary grant
as a sort of reward for their past industry and creative contributions?
IP:
I see no problem with that-at least so long as the grant
qualifies as spending for "the general welfare" 4 4 and doesn't amount
to a violation of due process, the equal protection principle, or some
45
other constitutional prohibition because it's "special" legislation.
Your hypothetical presents a spending-power issue, not a copyrightpower issue.
CL: Hey!
around here!

I thought I was the constitutional law scholar

IP:
Why on earth should it matter in the Eldred case whether
Congress can grant monetary subsidies to existing copyright hold46
ers?
Because that's exactly what-as a practical matterCL:
Congress has done. The only difference is that the CTEA gives
away the congressional subsidy in the form of a monopoly right
rather than in the form of cash. And why should that fact make any
constitutional difference? After all, many4 7constitutional cases say
that substance is more important than form.
IP:
Of course. However, what you're missing is that there
are two real-and very big--differences between cash gifts and
copyright term extensions.
CL:

What are they?

IP:
First, the Intellectual Property Clause simply doesn't apply to cash subsidies and similar outright handouts. By its terms, the
Clause constrains Congress only when it grants an "exclusive Right"
to authors and inventors. 48 Writing a check is not the same thing as
granting someone a monopoly right. Our whole legal culture-with
good reason-has always looked askance at monopolies that limit
the freedom and industry of others.

CL:

Fair enough. What's the other real difference?
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IP:
The second difference has to do with political-process
considerations. 49 The point is that outright subsidies are almost always controversial and therefore subject to significant political scrutiny. It's very hard to pull the wool over the public's eyes when
Congress is handing out buckets of dollar bills. The CTEA, on the
other hand, was passed quickly without opposition. It effected a
transfer payment worth billions from consumers to copyright holders
without anyone noticing. Imagine if Congress instead had decided to
tax consumers and write a $1 billion check to Disney and another
one to ASCAP!
CL: You've got a point there. In fact, I recently read a law
review article that developed this very point in discussing-you
guessed it-the dormant Commerce Clause. ° You'll also be interested to know that the Supreme Court has recently emphasized these
same sorts of concerns about transparency and accountability5 in the
context of assessing the scope of Congress's Article I powers. 1
IP:
So there! My quid pro quo test makes good sense, andunlike all that means-ends stuff-it's simple to apply.
CL: Is it? It seems to me that, whatever test one comes up
with, there will be cases on its edges that create difficulties with application. What if, for example, Congress conditioned retroactive
term extensions for works A, B, and C on the prospective creation of
work D? Would that transfer involve a quid pro quo? Or what if
Congress simply allowed the transfer of the newly earned term for
work A to work B? Besides, you can't just make up some new test.
Where does your quid pro quo approach come from?
IP:
It comes from the history of the Intellectual
Property
52
Clause and the deliberate policy choices its text reflects.
CL:

What do you mean?

IP:
The Framers knew their English history and were well
aware of the abusive granting of exclusive rights perpetrated on the
public by Queen Elizabeth I and King James I. Favored courtiers
were granted "odious" monopolies in common products like ale, salt,
and window glass.53 The public suffered all the ills associated with
monopolies-high prices and reduced availability-while receiving
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no offsetting benefits at all.54 Eventually, the common law courts
held crown-sponsored monopolies illegal, 55and Parliament passed
anti-monopoly legislation shortly thereafter.
CL:

What about monopolies for new inventions?

IP:
That was the main exception recognized both by the
King's Bench in Darcy v. Allin 56 and by Parliament in the Statute of
Monopolies.57 If the Crown had purchased something new for the
public, then a monopoly was permitted. The Framers were familiar
with this history, and they were worried history might repeat itself in
their new nation. They drafted the Intellectual Property Clause as
they did because of this concern. In fact, Americans were more
aware than anyone of the perils of monopolies because the Statute of
Monopolies was enforced only in England itself and not in the colonies. Don't ever forget that one of the causes of the American Revolution was the monopoly on the sale of tea in the colonies granted to
the East India Company!
CL: I won't, but I still don't understand how all this means
the Court should adopt your quid pro quo test.
IP:
Haven't you been listening? The quid pro quo test fits
both the history and the language of the Intellectual Property Clause
like a glove. Copyright protection can be given only "[t]o promote... Progress"--and that means the creation of new things.5 In
other words, copyright protection can be given only as part of a
genuine exchange or trade for the creation of something that did not
exist before. At bottom, the clause shows a fear of Congress behaving as irresponsibly as the Crown. While I'm on my high horse, I
might add that's exactly what happened when Congress passed the
CTEA. A favored courtier of the Clinton administration, the entertainment industry, successfully approached Congress for a nostrings-attached hand-out in the form of extended monopolies on
Mickey Mouse and thousands of other valuable books, songs, and
pieces of art. We, like English consumers long ago, will foot the bill
for these gifts to a favored few. 59 Just ask your wife how many dollars she had to spend yesterday for that expensive edition of
Gershwin's Concerto in F because she couldn't print it for free off
the Internet.

112
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CL: Can't you get to the same place by talking about a lack
of meaningful connection between permissible ends and chosen
means instead talking about a quid pro quo?
IP:
Maybe, but looking solely for the presence of a quid pro
quo-and nothing more-has several protective features. First, it
makes it impossible for the government to use legislative historyor, worse yet, evidence of good motive cooked up after the fact by
lawyers-as a smokescreen for congressional giveaways. Second,
even if Congress is well meaning, the quid pro quo test reduces the
risk that Congress will mistakenly grant exclusive rights contrary to
the public good. Under the quid pro quo test, Congress has to buy
the public something. That's what we want; that's what's in the public interest; and that-and that alone-is what the Intellectual Property Clause was meant to foster. Third, the quid pro quo test removes the need for courts to address extremely messy questions
about subjective motivation and the effectiveness of legislation. Finally, as I said before, focusing attention on the form of the transfer
will heighten political accountability.
CL: Well, let me ask you this question. You keep relying on
the new-invention exception to the Statute of Monopolies. Maybe
that makes sense when we are talking about patents, but Eldred con60
cerns copyright law, doesn't it?
IP:
You're not going to suggest that the quid pro quo test
should apply to patents, but not copyrights, are you? No plausible
reading of the constitutional text-which treats patents and copyrights together-would support that result. Plus, there are strong historical reasons for looking with particular skepticism at copyright
protections awarded in the absence of a true exchange.
CL:

How so?

IP:
Until the Statute of Anne was enacted in 1710, Parliament granted the Stationer's Company the exclusive right to print
books. 61 Further, it could only print those books the Crown and the
Churchi of England permitted it to print.62 As a result, the Stationer's
Company became an engine for the suppression of political and religious speech.63 This vehicle of censorship was broken by the Statute

Fall 2002]

ELDRED V. ASHCROFT IN ONE ACT

of Anne when authors were granted the exclusive right to their works
for a short fourteen-year term. 64 A large public domain was thereby
stimulated, and the marketplace of ideas flourished-largely because
of the state's trading of the copyright for the creation of new works.
When Congress locks up expression for increasingly long periods of
time by extending copyright protection for works already created,
history mandates that a very strict judicial approach should be triggered.
CL: Your history seems sound, but I still think the constitutional test you're trying to extract from it may not promote the goals
that history reveals to be important. 65 In particular, you view the
quid pro quo test as a bastion of protection for the public. But whentest, the
ever the Court creates a highly specific and objective formal
66
it.
circumvent
to
ways
find
lobbyists)
by
(aided
lawmakers
IP:
I see where you're coming from. It's not hard to imagine a statute put in the form of a purchase that would be detrimental
to scientific progress. For example, computer programmers think
that protecting new software for the life of its author plus seventy
years is absurd.6 7 Anything longer than about two years is just a gift
to Bill Gates. It would be nice if the Court examined whether the
term length for software is counterproductively long. (In addition,
I'm troubled by your previous hypotheticals about transferable copyrights and works A, B, C and D.)68 Still, this business about
means/ends analysis is tough for me to swallow. I just don't trust the
Court to ferret out bad motives or bad means/end fits.
CL: Then why not keep your quid pro quo test, but then supplement it with an additional, complementary constitutional requirement?
IP:
Could the Court do that? Could the Court require both a
quid pro quo and some sound means/end relationship in copyright
legislation?
CL: I don't see why not, since the Court does this sort of
thing all the time. Under the Establishment Clause, for example, the
Court strikes down laws that have the purpose of promoting religion. 69 Even when the Court can't discover such a purpose, however,
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it will strike down a law when the promotion of religion is its primary effect. 70 You might say that the effect test is sort of a backstop
to guard against lawmakers who are sufficiently sophisticated to
mask their wrongful purpose. An even better example comes fromyou guessed it-the dormant Commerce Clause cases. If the challenged law overtly discriminates against interstate commerce, it's
unconstitutional (or at least "virtually" so).71 But the Court doesn't
stop there. Even if the law is neutral on its face, the Court engages in
a means-ends analysis to see if it "smells" too much like a hidden
protectionist measure. 72 If it does, the Court will throw the law out
even if it's not discriminatory on its face or in its avowed purpose.
The point is that the sort of dual-protection rule we are considering
for the Intellectual Property Clause is common fare in constitutional
law. 73 I see no reason why the Court couldn't require both a quid pro
quo and some demonstration that a law works well enough not to
constitute a cleverly disguised giveaway.
IP:
better!!!

Now your means-ends analysis is starting to sound a lot

CL: In fact, I suspect--despite all your hand-wringing about
legislative ends and means-that you and I don't view the Intellectual Property Clause very differently at all.
IP:

What do you mean?

CL: You have convinced me, at least for now, that the Intellectual Property Clause is special. In particular, I'm inclined to agree
with your notion that-at least absent extraordinary circumstancesany award of copyright protection is unconstitutional unless it does
"promote" the creation of new work in keeping with the terms of the
Intellectual Property Clause itself. By the way, this conclusion
brings us back to Reid v. Covert.74 If the Intellectual Property Clause
in fact operates as a constraint on, as well as a grant of, congressional
power, then Congress should not be able to win the Eldred case simply by relying on its authority to make treaties or regulate foreign affairs. I might add that the shared purposes of the Intellectual Property Clause and the Free Speech and Press Clauses 75 make Eldred an
appealing case for application of the Reid principle, since both Reid
76
and Eldred concern protection of individual rights.
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Good!

CL: I tend to agree with the logic behind your quid pro quo
principle, and I don't think that I have a problem applying it as a
freestanding (though not as the sole) constitutional test. In other
words, if it's obvious that Congress hasn't gotten something in exchange for the grant of copyright protection, I would say that Congress hasn't done anything "[t]o promote" the sort of new work with
which the Intellectual Property Clause is concerned. Such grants
might be called "per se" violations of the anti-monopoly principle
inherent in the clause.77 Alternatively, we could say that such a grant
is unlawful "on its face" 78 because by definition it lacks the requisite
purpose of "incentivizing" the creation of new work.
IP:

Now you're talking!

CL:

That reveals something else very important that we agree

IP:

It does?

on.

CL: It reveals that at bottom we're both concerned with congressional motive. We agree, based primarily on the specialized text
of the Intellectual Property Clause, that the only purpose for which
Congress can grant copyrights is to incentivize-that is, to stimulate
the creation of new works.
IP:

Excellent.

CL: Yet, I think I would even go further than you. In particular, I suspect there are some cases in which Congress would supply
some quid pro quo-but only a very lame one. The question then
becomes whether Congress has genuinely acted to "promote" new
works. It's important for you to see that using means/ends analysis
in this sort of case doesn't necessarily involve a fuzzy inquiry into
the fine points of legislative history or a probing of the actual subjective mental states of 535 or some other number of elected federal officials. These sorts of cases are driven by a concern about purpose,
but the assessment of purpose is based on objective factors-just like
under your quid pro quo pro test. As the Supreme Court has explained time and again, an objective means/ends analysis-inspired
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by concerns about wrongful purpose-makes sense because "if upon
examination it becomes clear that there is no substantial relationship
between the statutes and their purported objectives, this may well indicate that these objectives were not the statute's objectives in the
first place. 79

IP:
Basically you would fine tune my quid pro quo test to
cover cases that involve phony-baloney, largely formal acts of incentivization.
CL:

That's a fair way to put the point.

IP:
But would you go beyond the quid pro quo test in a case
like Eldred?
CL: In Eldred, there's no need to do more than that, but in
other cases I would be open to striking down copyright laws that are
marked by poor means-end fits, especially when they only technically meet the quid pro quo requirement. If the purpose of the Intellectual Property Clause is to outlaw freebie monopoly grants, why
should we find some sort of "peppercorn" trade-off to be enough?
Wow, if my actuary friends are right about the negligible
IP:
value of distant future income streams, you may be casting doubt on
the CTEA's prospective twenty-year extension of the copyright term!
Anyway, you seem clearly convinced of at least one thing.
CL:

What's that?

IP:
That the opening language of the Intellectual Property
Clause means something. Surely the D.C. Circuit was wrong to hold
has no
that "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts"
80
whatsoever.
power
effect on the scope of the congressional
CL: For now at least, I will strongly agree with you on that
point. Marbury itself teaches that we should try hard not to read any
constitutional
clause as "mere surplusage" that is "entirely without
8
meaning." '
We also seem to agree that a key question is whether the
IP:
Court should extract from that language an objective quid pro quo
test, some means-ends test, or some combination of the two.
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I agree with that too. In any event, we'll find out
CL:
whether we're right pretty soon-unless the Court is able to sidestep
all these Intellectual Property Clause issues by invalidating the
CTEA on First Amendment grounds.
Well that's a conversation for another day! Let me buy
IP:
you a beer, and you can tell me what Bushrod Washington would
think about the merits of the legislative purpose component of modem dormant Commerce Clause analysis.
J. Alton Hosch Professor, University of Georgia School of Law.
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